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ABSTRACT Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS)’s security importance attracts a lot of attention
these days. Whatever the security of TMIS improves, its application becomes wider. To address this
requirement, recently, Li et al. proposed a new privacy-preserving RFID authentication protocol for TMIS.
After that, Zhou et al. and also Benssalah et al. presented their scheme, which is not secure, and they
presented their new authentication protocol and claim that their proposal can provide higher security for
TMIS applications. In this stream, Zheng et al. proposed a novel authentication protocol with application
in smart campus, including TMIS. In this paper, we present an efficient impersonation and replay attacks
against Zheng et al. with the success probability of 1 and a desynchronization attack which is applicable
against all of the rest three mentioned protocols with the success probability of 1 − 2−n, where n is the
protocols parameters length. After that, we proposed a new protocol despite these protocols can resist the
attacks presented in this paper and also other active and passive attacks. Our proposed protocol’s security is
also done both informally and formally through the Scyther tool.
INDEX TERMS Telecare medicine information system, security, authentication, residue theorem, hash
function.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the applications of Radio Frequency IDentification
(RFID) is in e-health and medical care systems. RFID is a
technology for the identification of objects using radio waves.
Three main components of an RFID system are tags, readers
and a database for the access and authenticationmanagement.
There are three different types of tags mainly attending to
the signal’s distance and its price: active, semi-passive and
passive. Active tags are the most expensive and are able to
establish a connection within a reader by itself. Semi-passive
tags can either, use the power of a reader’s signal or com-
municate within a reader without the reader’s signal; while
passive tags are the cheapest and need a reader’s signal to
communicate with it. The connection between the tag and the
reader is generally considered as wireless and insecure while
the connection between the reader and the server/database
could be a permanent connection based on for example fiber
optic as the media or wireless and insecure. In the latter case,
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the reader is called mobile. A mobile reader provides more
flexibility and could be used in awider variety of applications.
A protocol that supports a mobile reader could be appropriate
for Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS) where for
example a nurse shouldmove from a patient to another patient
and track their critical data. However, the security of such a
protocol could be very vital due to the patient safety and the
sensitivity of his/her personal data that should not be revealed
to any unauthorized party.
A. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION
In the field of health care, similar to other applications,
the privacy of the users and the security of their information
is a very critical issue. The user in this application could be
a doctor, a nurse or a patient and their information could
vary from their personal data to the history of their medical
services and so on. New technologies, such as RFID and the
Internet of things (IoT) can improve the quality and the speed
of a medical service which is provided for a patient and also
provide enough information for medical service providers
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to provide better service for their patients. However, as it
has been already mentioned, besides these benefits any new
technology has its own risk and concerns. For RFID and IoT,
illegal access to the system information is a potential risk
which can cause many problems varies from compromising
the user’s privacy to given wrong medical service to a patient
which lead to his/her death. Hence, during the last decade,
many researchers tried to address these concerns by provid-
ing various protocols for access control, authentication and
key management in such applications, e.g. [1]–[8], [8]–[11],
[11]–[13]. However, the later analyzes performed in the field
of security analysis of those protocols [14]–[19] show that
the research community has not yet reached a comprehensive
secure protocol. In this paper, we target the security analysis
of some recent protocols in this category.
To address these concerns, Srivastava et al. [20] proposed a
hash-based mutual RFID authentication protocol in Telecare
Medicine Information System (TMIS) and claimed security
against active and passive attacks such as forgery, trace-
ability, replay, and desynchronization attack. However, later
in [21], Li et al. pointed out the security vulnerabilities of
Srivastava et al. [20] including having a weak login phase
which increases the adversary’s advantage to a successful
login, its weakness against the stolen/lost reader and also
having low efficiency. To remedy these flaws, they also
presented a new protocol. Benssalah et al. [28] showed the
security flaws of Li et al. protocol including its vulnerability
against desynchronization and impersonation attacks and also
not ensuring the protocol’s transferred messages integrity and
also data privacy and also proposed an improved version.
In addition, Zhou et al. [22] showed weaknesses of Li et al.
protocol and proposed a protocol, used residue theorem and
also hash functions as building blocks of their proposed
proposal and claimed to be suitable for TMIS applications.
Mir and Nikooghadam [23] tried to employ biometric in
their authentication with key agreement protocol for TMIS.
Later, Abbasinezhad-Mood and Nikooghadam [24] tried to
provide data protection in TMIS using elliptic curve based
cryptography (ECC) to employ. However, it is yet may not
be possible to implement such a cryptosystem in a passive
RFID tag with very constrained environments. Very recently,
Tan [25] presented a new secure delegation-based authenti-
cation protocol by using the identity-based cryptography for
TMIS. In addition, Li et al. [26] proposed a chaotic map-
based remote authentication scheme for TMIS. In order to
address the need for the security protocols in smart campus
including TMIS, Zheng et al. [27] also proposed a new
authentication scheme.
B. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contribution of this paper is two folds. At first,
we consider the security of some of those protocols that
are proposed for mobile readers and show that they do not
provide the desired security. More precisely, we show that
Zheng et al. [27] protocol suffers from replay attacks. In addi-
tion, assuming that the adversary can control the time setting
TABLE 1. Notations used in the protocols’ description.
of the readers, then it is possible to apply desynchronization
attack against Li et al. [21] protocol and its successors.
Secondly, we propose a secure authentication protocol for
mobile readers that only uses a hash function and bitwise
XOR operation, which is more realistic to be implemented
in a passive tag than other proposals such as Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) and other public key based solutions.
Moreover, we analyze its security against various attacks
in the context such as desynchronization, traceability, secret
disclosure, and impersonation attacks and show its security
against these attacks. We also verify the correctness of our
protocol using a formal approach through Scyther tool.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section II,
we briefly review Zheng et al. protocol, Li et al. pro-
tocol, Benssalah et al. protocol and Zhou et al. protocol
respectively. Our proposed attacks against these protocols are
explained in Section III. Section IV and Section V describe
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FIGURE 1. The Zheng et al.’s hash based mobile RFID mutual authentication protocol [27].
our new proposed protocol and its security proof respectively
and finally this paper concludes in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The notations which are used in this paper are represented
in Table 1.
A. ZHENG et al. PROTOCOL FOR SMART CAMPUS
To address the need for the security protocols in smart campus
including TMIS, recently, Zheng et al. [27] proposed a new
authentication protocol represented in Fig. 1 and proceeds as
below:
1) The reader starts a session and sends Query message
along with its local timestamp T1 to the tag.
2) Once the tag receives the message, it generates a ran-
dom number Rt and computes N1 = h(IDk‖T1‖Rt ),
N2 = Rt ⊕ T1 and sends them along Rt to the reader.
3) When the reader receives the message, it computes




= Rt is or not.
If it is not, aborts the protocol otherwise computes
N3 = h(RIDk‖T1‖Rt ) and sends it along with N1, T1
and Rt to the database.
4) Upon receipt the message, the database retrieves its
local time T2 and computes the time interval 1T ,
if 1T > 1T ′, it concludes there is an attack and
aborts the protocol, otherwise searches its records to
find any record that h(RID′k‖T1‖Rt ) = N3, if it founds
out a matching record, it concludes the reader is suc-
cessfully authenticated. Then it searches its record to
find a matching that h(ID′k‖T1‖Rt ) = N1. If it finds
any record that means the tag is successfully authenti-
cated. After that it computes N4 = h(RID′k‖T2), N5 =
h(ID′k‖T2) and sends them along with T2 to the reader.
5) Once receipt the message, the reader using received
T2, computes h(RIDk‖T2) and verifies whether
h(RIDk‖T2)
?
= N4 is or not. If it is not, aborts the
protocol otherwise the reader’s authentication for the
database has successfully done and sendsN5 alongwith
T2 to the tag.
6) When receives the message, the tag using received T2,
computes h(IDk‖T2) and verifies whether h(IDk‖T2)
?
=
N5 is or not. If it is not, aborts the protocol otherwise
the tag’s authentication to the database has successfully
done and so the protocol ends.
B. LI et al. PROTOCOL FOR TMIS
Li et al. [21] pointed out the security vulnerabilities of Srivas-
tava et al. [20] including having a weak login phase which
increases the adversary’s advantage to successful login, its
weakness against the stolen/lost reader and also having low
efficiency. To remedy these flaws, they presented a new pro-
tocol which as illustrated in Fig. 2, proceeds as below in two
phases:
1) BOOT READER PHASE
Since Li et al. designed their protocol to be employed in
TelecareMedicine Information System, take in to account the
boot reader phase. To boot the reader, the TMIS staff must:
1) input the reader identifier RIDk and the reader pass-
word RPWk ;
2) The reader computes V ′k = WK ⊕ RIDk ⊕ RPWk ,
and checks whether V ′k
?
= Vk is or not. If it holds,
the reader successfully booted otherwise the reader
stops the protocol process.
2) AUTHENTICATION PHASE
1) The reader starts this phase by generating random num-
berRr and computingA = V ′k⊕Rr ,B = h(V
′
k⊕T1⊕Rr )
and sending them along time stamp T1 to the tag;
2) Once the tag received the message, it:
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FIGURE 2. The Li et al.’s hash based mobile RFID mutual authentication protocol [21].
• generates another random number Rt and com-
putes C = h(sj‖IDk ) ⊕ Rt , D = h(h(sj‖IDk ) ⊕
T2 ⊕ Rt );
• and sends IDk , C , D and T2 to the reader.
3) Upon receipt the message, the reader:
• computes T1 − T2 where T1 is the reader’s current
time stamp and checks whether T1 − T2 ≤ 1T
is or not. If it is not, it aborts the protocol process
and otherwise sends RIDk , A, B , T1, IDk , C ,D and
T2 to the server.
4) When the server receives the message, computes T3 −
T2 where T3 is the server’s current timestamp and
checks whether T3 − T2 ≤ 1T is or not. If it is not,
the server aborts the protocol process and otherwise
continues as below;
• retrieves R∗r as R
∗
r = A⊕ h(xj‖RIDk );
• computes B∗ = h(h(xj‖RIDk ) ⊕ T1 ⊕ R∗r ) and
checks whether B∗ ?= B, if it does not hold, stops
the protocol otherwise continues as below;
• retrieves R∗t = C ⊕ h(sj‖IDk );
• computesD∗ = h(h(sj‖IDk )⊕T2⊕R∗t ) and checks
whether D∗ ?= D, if it does not hold, stops the
protocol otherwise continues as below.
• computesE = h(xj‖RIDk‖T1‖R∗r ‖h(xj⊕R
∗
r )),F =





and updates its records as follows:
• updates xj and xj−1 as xj+1 = h(xj ⊕ R∗r ) and xj
respectively;
• updates sj and sj−1 as sj+1 = h(sj ⊕ R∗t ) and sj
respectively;
• and finally sends E , F and G to the reader;
5) Once the reader receives the message, it:
• computes E∗ = h(xj‖RIDk‖T1‖Rr‖h(xj⊕Rr )) and
checks whether E∗ ?= E is or not. If it is not
stops the protocol’s process otherwise the Data’s
integrity successfully verified and it successfully
authenticates the server;
• obtains Data as F ⊕ h(xj ⊕ Rr );
• updates its related records i.e. xj as xj+1 = h(xj ⊕
Rr );
• and sends G to the tag.
6) Upon receipt the message, the tag computes G∗ =
h(sj‖IDk‖T2‖Rt‖h(sj ⊕ Rt )) and checks whether
G∗ ?= G. If it is not, stops the protocol process other-
wise successfully authenticates the reader and updated
its sj to sj+1 = h(sj ⊕ Rt ).
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FIGURE 3. The Benssalah et al.’s hash based mobile RFID mutual authentication protocol [28].
C. BENSSALAH et al. PROTOCOL FOR TMIS
Benssalah et al. [28] showed the security flaws of Li et al.
protocol including its vulnerability against desynchronization
and impersonation attacks and also not ensuring the proto-
col’s transferred messages integrity and also data privacy.
All of these weaknesses lead to not employing this protocol
in TMIS systems. They also tried to propose a new improved
version of the Li et al.’s protocol and claim their protocol
have a suitable level of security. As illustrated in Fig. 3, their
protocol works as follows in two phases:
1) BOOT READER PHASE
Since Benssalah et al. designed their protocol to be employed
in Telecare Medicine Information System, take in to account
the boot reader phase. To boot the reader, same as Li et al.
protocol, the TMIS staff must:
• input the reader identifier RIDk and reader password
RPWk ;
• the reader computes V ′k = WK ⊕ RIDk ⊕ RPWk , and
checks whether V ′k
?
= Vk is or not. If it holds the
reader successfully booted otherwise the reader stops the
protocol process.
2) AUTHENTICATION PHASE
1) The reader starts this phase by generating random num-
ber Rr and sending it to the tag;
2) Once the tag received the message, it:
• generates another random number Rt and com-
putes A = h(sj‖IDkj )⊕Rt , B = A⊕h(IDkj‖Rr‖Rt ),
C = h(B⊕ T1 ⊕ Rt );
• and sends A, B and C to the reader.
3) Upon receipt the message, the reader:
• computes T2 − T1 where T2 is the reader’s cur-
rent time stamp and checks whether T2 − T1 ≤
1T is or not. If it is not, the reader aborts
the protocol process and otherwise computes
D = h(RIDk‖T2‖Rr );
• and sends A, C , D, T1, T2, IDkj , Rr to the server.
4) When the server receives the message, computes
T3 − T2 where T3 is the server’s current time stamp and
checks whether T3 − T2 ≤ 1T is or not. If it is not,
the server aborts the protocol process and otherwise
continues as below;
• computes D∗ = h(RIDk‖T2‖Rr ) and checks
D∗ ?= D, if it does not hold, stops the protocol
otherwise continues as below;
• retrieves R∗t as R
∗
t = A⊕ h(sj‖IDkj ) and computes
C∗ = h(A⊕ h(IDkj‖Rr‖R
∗
t )⊕ T1 ⊕ R
∗
t );
• checks whether C∗ ?= C , if it does not hold, stops
the protocol otherwise continues as below;
• generates Rs and computes
DT = h(A⊕ h(IDkj‖Rr‖R
∗
t )⊕ T2⊕ T3⊕ sj)⊕ Rs;
E = h(sj‖IDkj‖Rs‖R
∗
t ); F = Data ⊕ RIDk ⊕ Rr ;
G = h(Data‖Rr‖T3);
• After successful tag and reader authentication,
the server updates its related records from the
reader and tags as follows:
– updates sj and sj−1 as sj+1 = h(sj ⊕ R∗t ⊕ Rs)
and sj respectively;
– updates IDkj as IDkj+1 = h(IDkj‖Rs‖R
∗
t );
• and sends DT , E , F , G and T3 to the reader;
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5) Once the reader receives the message, it:
• computes T4 − T3 where T4 is the reader’s current
time stamp and checks whether T4 − T3 ≤ 1T
is or not. If it is not, the server aborts the protocol
process and otherwise continues as below;
• obtains Data as F ⊕ RIDk ⊕ Rr ;
• computes G∗ = h(Data‖Rr‖T3) and checks
whether G∗ ?= G is or not. If it is not, stops the
protocol’s process otherwise the Data’s integrity
successfully verified and it successfully authenti-
cates the server;
• and sends DT , E , T2, T3 and T4 to the tag.
6) Upon receipt the message, the tag:
• computes T5−T4 where T5 is the tag’s current time
stamp and checks whether T5−T4 ≤ 1T is or not.
If it is not, the server aborts the protocol process
and otherwise continues as below;
• retrieves R∗s as DT ⊕ h(A⊕ h(IDkj‖Rr‖Rt )⊕ T2 ⊕
T3 ⊕ sj);
• computes E∗ = h(sj‖IDkj‖R
∗
s ‖Rt ) and checks
whether E∗ ?= E . If it is not, stops the protocol
process otherwise successfully authenticates the
reader and updates its sj to sj+1 = h(sj ⊕ Rt ⊕ R∗s )
and its IDkj as IDkj+1 = h(IDkj‖R
∗
s ‖Rt ).
D. ZHOU et al. PROTOCOL FOR TMIS
Zhou et al. [22] due to address the weaknesses of Li et al.
protocol and also provide the strong privacy preservation for
their proposed scheme which makes it suitable for TMIS
applications, used residue theorem and also hash functions
as building blocks of their proposed proposal. They also
designed their protocol in such a way despite the Li et al.
and also Benssalah et al. the reader identifier RIDk and also
the tag’s identifier IDk have not been transferred in plain
text form. Their proposed protocol as depicted in Fig. 4
proceeds in three phases of pre-phase, boot reader phase, and
authentication phase.
1) PRE-PHASE
In this phase, the protocol parties generate and store their
related secrets. Precisely:
• The server generates and stores four prime numbers
p,q,g and h as its private keys and n = p.q and m = g.h
as its public keys.
• The tag generates and stores its identifier IDk and its
secret value sj. Beside on this, the tag saves the n and
shares (IDk , sj, sj−1) and the hash function h(.) with the
server.
• The reader stores its identifier RIDk and its secret value
xj and also Vk = h(xj‖RIDk ), Wk = h(xj‖RIDk ) ⊕
RIDk ⊕ RPWk = Vk ⊕ RIDk ⊕ RPWk , m and h(.) as
one way hash function. The reader shares RIDk , xj and
xj−1 with the server.
2) BOOT READER PHASE
Since Zhou et al. designed their protocol to be employed in
Telecare Medicine Information System, take in to account
the boot reader phase. To boot the reader, the TMIS staff
must:
• input the reader identifier RIDk and the reader password
RPWk ;
• the reader computes V ′k = WK ⊕ RIDk ⊕ RPWk , and
checks whether V ′k
?
= Vk is or not. If it holds, the reader
successfully booted otherwise the reader stops the pro-
tocol process.
3) AUTHENTICATION PHASE
1) The reader starts this phase by generating a random
number Rr1 and sending it along time stamp T1 to the
tag;
2) Once the tag received the message, it:
• generates another random number Rt and com-
putes x = IDk⊕T1⊕sj⊕Rt ,A = (Rr1‖x)2 mod n,
B = R2t mod n and C = (Rr1‖sj)
2 mod n;
• and sends A, B and C to the reader.
3) Upon receipt the message, the reader:
• generates another random number Rr2 and com-
putes y = RIDk ⊕ T1 ⊕ Rr2 ⊕ xj, D =
(Rr1‖y)2 mod m, E = R2r2 mod m, F =
(Rr1‖xj)2 mod m and G = h(RIDk‖Rr1‖A‖T1);
• and sends A, B, C , T1, D, E , F , Rr1 and G to the
server.
4) When the server receives the message, computes T2 −
T1 where T2 is the server’s current timestamp and
checks whether T2 − T1 ≤ 1T is or not. If it is not,
the server aborts the protocol process and otherwise
continues as below:
• by using Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT) and g
and h solves the equations F = (Rr1‖xj)2 mod m ,
D = (Rr1‖y)2 mod m and E = (Rr2)2 mod m and
obtains xj and y and (Rr21 ,Rr22 ,Rr23 ,Rr24 ) where
xj and y are uniquely retrieved by using Rr1 from
four equations.
• computes RIDk = y⊕T1⊕Rr2m ⊕ xj and searches
the tags related records by using RIDk as index
which in the worst case it only occurs four times.
• If any related record is founded, checks whether
h(RIDk‖Rr1‖A‖T1)
?
= G, if it holds the sever
can obtain RIDk , xj and xj−1 and checks whether
xj
?
= xj or xj−1. If it holds, the server successfully
authenticates the reader and otherwise it stops the
authentication process.
• by using Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT),
solves the equations C = (Rr1‖sj)2 mod n, A =
(Rr1‖x)2 mod n andB = (Rt )2 mod n and obtains
x and sj and (Rt1,Rt2,Rt3,Rt4);
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FIGURE 4. The Zhou et al.’s residue based TMIS authentication protocol [22].
• computes IDk = x ⊕ T1 ⊕ sj ⊕ Rtm and
searches the tags related records by using IDk as
index which in the worst case it only occurs four
times.
• If any related record is founded, the server can
obtain IDk , sj and sj−1 and checks whether sj
?
=
sj or sj−1. If it holds, the server successfully
authenticates the tag and otherwise, it stops the
authentication process.
• After successful tag and reader authentication,
the server updates its related records from the
reader and tags as follows:
– If xj = xj, updates xj and xj−1 as h(xj⊕Rr2) and
xj respectively;
– If xj = xj−1, updates xj and xj−1 as h(xj−1⊕Rr2)
and xj−1 respectively;
– If sj = sj, updates sj and sj−1 as h(sj ⊕ Rt ) and
sj respectively;
– If sj = sj−1, updates sj and sj−1 as h(sj−1 ⊕ Rt )
and sj−1 respectively;
• informs the related records of tag and the data of
tag Data to the reader as follows:
– if xj = xj computes H = Data ⊕ h(xj ⊕ Rr2 ⊕
RIDk ) and I = h(Data‖Rr2);
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– if xj = xj−1 computes H = Data ⊕ h(xj−1 ⊕
Rr2 ⊕ RIDk ) and I = h(Data‖Rr2);
– if sj = sj computes J = h(sj ⊕ IDk ⊕ Rt ⊕
h(sj ⊕ Rt ));
– if sj = sj−1 computes J = h(sj−1 ⊕ IDk ⊕ Rt ⊕
h(sj−1 ⊕ Rt ));
• and sends H , I and J to the reader;
5) Once the reader receives the message, it:
• obtains Data as H ⊕ h(xj ⊕ Rr2 ⊕ RIDk );
• computes I∗ = h(Data‖Rr2) and checks whether
I∗ ?= I is or not. If it is not, the reader stops the
protocol’s process otherwise the Data’s integrity
successfully verified and it successfully authenti-
cates the server;
• computes K = Wk ⊕ h(xj‖RIDK );
• updates its related records i.e. xj, Vk and Wk as
xj = h(xj ⊕ Rr2), Vk = h(xj‖RIDk ) and Wk =
K ⊕h(xj‖RIDk ) respectively where xj used them is
updated.
• and sends J to the tag.
6) Upon receipt the message, the tag computes J∗ =
h(sj ⊕ IDk ⊕ Rt ⊕ h(sj ⊕ Rt )) and checks whether
J∗ ?= J . If it is not, stops the protocol process otherwise
successfully authenticates the reader and updates its sj
to h(sj ⊕ Rt ).
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOLS
A. ADVERSARY MODEL
We consider an active adversary who can stand between the
tag and the reader or the reader and the back-end server,
given that the Zhou et al.’s protocol targets mobile readers
and assumed that both the channels of reader-tag and reader-
back-end server are all insecure [22, Sec. 4.2]. In addition,
if it is required, we assume that the adversary can control the
time stamp of the mobile reader, which is not an unrealistic
assumption and it is possible to change the time setting of the
mobile reader.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ZHENG et al. PROTOCOL
In the case of Zheng et al.’s protocol [27], the protocol’s
parties do not update shared values. Hence we cannot desyn-
chronize them and it is better to try to impersonate a protocol
party. An option is to impersonate the server and the reader
toward the tag. The reason comes from the fact the tag has
no local time and any time suggested from the reader is
acceptable for the tag. In this protocol, any adversary can
impersonate the reader to the tag as it is explained here. To end
this, the adversary can eavesdrop transferred messages in a
legitimate session between the tag, the reader and the server
and stores tuple T1,T2,N5 = h(ID′k‖T2). Now, at any desired
time, to impersonate the reader, the adversary sends a query











t ⊕ T1 and R
′
t is a fresh
random value generated by the tag for this session. Now the
adversary returns the stored N5 = h(ID′k‖T2) and T2 to the
tag and will be definitely authenticated by the adversary. The
flaw comes from the fact the server does not randomize its
answer by the randomness contributed by the tag and the
reader. This attack can be considered as tag traceability attack
also which compromises the tag holder anonymity which
shows that the protocol does not preserve the user privacy.
The above-mentioned impersonation attack which is also
replay attack is fair enough to rule out any application of
the Zheng et al.’s protocol [27]. However, if the adversary
can force the reader time to a specific time, following the
adversarymodel explained in Section III-A, then it can imper-
sonate the reader and the tag set toward the server. It should be
noted such an attack is of practical interest and in literature,
a class of protocols called distance bounding protocols, e.g.
see [29]–[32] for this concept, aim to withstand such an
attack. Hence, it is important to defend an attack in which
the adversary eavesdrops the generated messages by the tag
and the reader in a location/time and use them in another
location/time. The target of the attack procedure which is
explained here against Zheng et al.’s protocol is such an
attack. Assuming that the adversary is aiming to be authenti-
cated by the server at a specified time T1, the attack could be
as follows:
1) Similarly, we assume that the adversary changes the
reader’s time, i.e forces it to be a T1 which is the target
time for passing the server.
2) We assume that there will be a session between the
reader and the tag next, where the reader starts a session
and sends Query message along with its local times-
tamp T1 to the tag.
3) Once the tag receives the message, it generates a ran-
dom number Rt and computes N1 = h(IDk‖T1‖Rt ),
N2 = Rt ⊕ T1 and send them along Rt to the reader.
4) When the reader receives the message, it computes




= Rt is or not.
If it is not, aborts the protocol otherwise computes
N3 = h(RIDk‖T1‖Rt ) and send it along with N1, T1
and Rt to the database.
5) Similarly, the adversary, who stands in the channel
between the reader and the server, blocks the trans-
ferred message ( N3, N1, T1, Rt ) but stores it for the
latter purposes.
6) The adversary reset/allow-to-be-reset the reader’s time
to the correct time which is synchronized with the
server’s time.
7) At appropriate time T1, the adversary sends the
stored messages from Step 5 to the server. The mes-
sages/tag/reader are authenticated by the server.
Moreover, it is easy to impersonate the server also. To imper-
sonate the server, it would be enough to eavesdrop the
transferred messages from the server to the tag and the
reader in a legitimate session which is the tuple (N4 =
h(RID′k‖T2),N5 = h(ID
′
k‖T2),T2), then returns it to the
reader in a later session. More precisely, based on the Step 5
of this protocol, to authenticate the server, the reader using
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received T2, computes h(RIDk‖T2) and verifies whether
h(RIDk‖T2)
?
= N4. Given RIDk is a static value, the reader
authenticates the database (impersonated by the adversary)
and sends N5 along with T2 to the tag. Now, based on the
Step 6 of the protocol, the tag also using received T2, com-
putes h(IDk‖T2) and verifies whether h(IDk‖T2)
?
= N5 and
authenticates the server and the reader. Onemay argue that the
attack can be fixed if the reader also evaluates the received T2,
to be in a reasonable duration from T1. However, in this case,
also we can apply the attack in the given adversary model.
More precisely, the adversary at the first forces the reader
time to a time close to T2 and then applies the attack.
The structure of the transferred messages has other weak-
nesses also but we omit them because we think the presented
replay attack against the protocol is fair enough to rule out
any possible application of this protocol.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ZHOU et al. AND
RELATED PROTOCOLS
Following the given adversary model in Section III-A,
we propose a desynchronization attack against the
Zhou et al.’s protocol. The attack procedure is as follows:
1) The adversary changes the reader’s time, e.g. forces
it to be a day ahead of the current time of the
server;
2) We assume that there will be a session between the
reader and the tag next, where the reader starts this
phase by generating random number Rr1 and sending
it along its current timestamp T1 to the tag;
3) Once the tag received the message, it generates a ran-
dom number Rt to compute A, B and C and sends
them to the reader, where x = IDk ⊕ T1 ⊕ sj ⊕ Rt ,
A = (Rr1‖x)2 mod n, B = R2t mod n and C =
(Rr1‖sj)2 mod n.
4) Upon receipt A, B and C , the reader generates another
random number Rr2, computes y, D, H and sends
A,B,C ,T1,D,E ,F ,Rr1and G to the server where: y =
RIDk ⊕ T1 ⊕ Rr2 ⊕ xj, D = (Rr1‖y)2 mod m,E =
R2r2 mod m,F = (Rr1‖xj)
2 mod m and G =
h(RIDk‖Rr1‖A‖T1).
5) The adversary, who stands in the channel between the
reader and the server, blocks the transferred message
but stores it for the later purposes.
6) The adversary reset/allow-to-be-reset the reader’s time
to the correct time which is synchronized with the
server’s time.
7) We again assume that there will be a session between
the reader and the tag next, where the reader starts the
session by generating random number R′r1 and sending
it along its current timestamp T ′1 to the tag;
8) Once the tag received the message, it generates a ran-
dom number R′t to compute A, B and C and sends




′)2 mod n, B′ = (R′t )
2 mod n and
C ′ = (R′r1‖sj)
2 mod n.
9) Upon receipt A′, B′ andC ′, the reader generates another
random number R′r2, computes y
′, D′, H ′ and sends
A′,B′,C ′,T ′1,D
′,E ′,F ′,R′r1and G
′ to the server where:
y′ = RIDk ⊕ T ′1 ⊕ R
′




E ′ = (R′r2)
2 mod m,F ′ = (R′r1‖xj)




10) The adversary does not intercept the rest of the process.
Hence, after authenticating the tag and the reader suc-
cessfully, the server updates its related records from the
reader and tags as follows:
• If xj = xj, which without loss of generality we
assume that it is the case, updates xj and xj−1 as
h(xj ⊕ R′r2) and xj respectively;
• If sj = sj, assuming it is, updates sj and sj−1 as
h(sj ⊕ R′t ) and sj respectively;
11) The reader also updates its related records i.e. xj,Vk and
Wk as xj = h(xj⊕R′r2),Vk = h(xj‖RIDk ) andWk = K⊕
h(xj‖RIDk ) respectively where xj used them is updated.
12) The tag updates sj to h(sj ⊕ R′t ).
13) From now on, up to the time predefined time T1,
the adversary blocks any message from the reader and
equivalently from the tag, to server. Hence, there will
not be any authentication between the server and the
reader/tag and their shared records remain fixed.
14) At appropriate time T1, the adversary sends the
stored messages from Step 5 to the server. The mes-
sages/tag/reader are authenticated based on the old
records of the server.
15) Given that x ′j = xj and s
′





secret values used in the sent messages by the adver-
sary, the server updates xj and xj−1 as h(xj ⊕ Rr2) and
xj respectively; it also updates sj and sj−1 as h(sj ⊕ Rt )
and sj respectively.
Given that Pr(Rr2 = R′r2) = 2
−n and Pr(Rt = R′t ) = 2
−n
then Pr(h(xj⊕Rr2) = h(xj⊕R′r2)) = 2
−n and Pr(h(sj⊕Rt ) =
h(sj ⊕ R′t )) = 2
−n, where we considered the length of all
parameters to be n bits. These show that the reader and the
tags record of xj and sj respectively do not match any of their
records in the server and the server will not authenticate them
anymore, which means they have been desynchronized. The
success probability of the given attack is 1− 2−n.
It should be noted this attack is applicable to Li et al.’s pro-
tocol [21] almost as it is. In addition, beside Zhou et al. [22],
Benssalah et al. [28] also analyzed the Li et al.’s protocol [21]
and proposed an improved version for it, also targeting a
secure authentication over a telecare medicine information
system. Given that in a telecare medicine information sys-
tem the reader should be mobile, it is possible to apply
almost an identical attack against their protocol also, i.e.
desynchronize the reader and the tag from the server. In addi-
tion, in Benssalah et al. protocol, each tag has an identi-
fier IDk which is updated after each successful run of the
protocol. Given that we can desynchronize the reader from
the server, the tag will never update its identifier hereafter.
Hence, it is also possible to compromise the tag/tag-holder
anonymity in that protocol.
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FIGURE 5. The proposed hash based mobile RFID mutual authentication protocol.
IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In order to address the weaknesses of the Zheng et al. [27]
protocol, in this section we propose an improved version of
this protocol. The main idea is involving all protocol parties
in the randomizing of the transferred messages. In addi-
tion, the only reliable source for the time could be the
server. Hence, the timestamp is introduced by the server in
the protocol and it will also verify the round trip time validity.
The proposed protocol’s representation is depicted in Fig. 5
and proceeds as below:
1) To start a session, the reader generates a fresh random
number Rr and sends Query message along Rr to the
server.
2) The server generates a fresh random number Rs and
sends its current timestamps T1 along Rs to the reader.
3) The reader sends T1 along Rr and Rs to the tag.
4) Once the tag receives the message, it generates a
random number Rt and computes N1 = h(IDk ⊕
Rr‖T1‖Rt‖Rs) and sends it along Rt to the reader.
5) When the reader receives the message, it computes
N2 = h(RIDk ⊕ Rr‖N1 ⊕ Rs) and sends it along with
N1 and Rt to the server.
6) Upon receipt the message, at the first the server com-
pares the current timestamps T2 with the sent T1 to
ensure that the reader and tag have returned their
responses in appropriate time. If it is so, then given the
tuple (T1,Rr ,Rs,Rt ,N1,N2) the server can search its
records to find the match RID′k and ID
′
k that satisfy N1
and N2. It is clear if it cannot find any match it means
that the reader/tag is not legitimate and the messages
intentionally/accidentally violated during the transfer
process. If the server finds a matched RID′k and ID
′
k
it authenticates the tag and computes N3 = h(RID′k ⊕
Rs‖Rr ), N4 = h(ID′k ⊕ Rs‖Rt ) and sends them to the
reader.
7) Once receipt the message, the reader verifies whether
h(RIDk ⊕Rs‖Rr )
?
= N3. If it is so, the server is authen-
ticated. It also means that the tag has been authenti-
cated by the server. Hence the tag is also authenticated.
On successful authentication, the reader forwards the
received N4 to the tag.
8) Once receipt the message, the tag verifies whether
h(IDk ⊕ Rs‖Rt )
?
= N4. If it is so, the server
is authenticated. It also means that the reader has
been authenticated by the server. Hence the reader is
also authenticated.
V. SECURITY PROOF OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, first in informalized manner we show that the
security correctness of proposed protocol and then based on
Scyther tool [33] which is an automatic formal prover, prove
the improved protocol has perfect security against all known
active and passive attacks.
A. INFORMAL PROOF OF SECURITY
1) RESISTANCE AGAINST DESYNCHRONIZATION ATTACK
Given that in the proposed protocol, similar to its predecessor
protocol by Zheng et al. [27], protocol parties do not update
their shared values, it is not possible to desynchronize them.
Hence, the proposed protocol does not suffer from the desyn-
chronization attack.
2) Resistance against secret disclosure attack
The secret parameters in the proposed protocol are IDk and
RIDk . Given that any message which is transferred over a
public channel is a function of these values are generated
by the hash function and it is not feasible to invert a hash
function in polynomial time, the adversary cannot extract
secret parameters IDk and RIDk in polynomial time. Hence,
the proposed protocol does not suffer from a secret disclosure
attack.
3) RESISTANCE AGAINST ALL KINDS OF IMPERSONATION
ATTACK AND REPLAY ATTACKS
In the proposed protocol, any message which is sent to a
receiver has been randomized at least by a nonce suggested by
the receiver. Hence, to impersonate X ∈ {tag, reader, server}
toward Y ∈ {tag, reader, server}, X should answer a chal-
lenge which is suggested by Y and the challenge is refreshed
in any session. More precisely:
• To impersonate the tag, assuming that the reader and the
server are legitimate, given a fresh Rr and a timestamp
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T1, the adversary should generate a valid N1 = h(IDk ⊕
Rr‖T1‖Rt‖Rs), without the knowledge of IDk which is
not feasible. However, when received Rr and T1, any
adversary can return a random pair as N1 and Rt . In the
server side, the severer searches whole its records to find
a match for N1 based on Rt , assuming that the |N1| = n,
then any comparison is satisfied with the probability
of 2−n. Assuming that the server keeps the records of
t tags, the success probability of the adversary on each
try will be almost t2−n and after q queries, it will be
almost qt2−n.
• To impersonate the reader, assuming that the tag and the
server are legitimate, given a fresh Rs and a timestamp
T1, the adversary should generate a validN2 = h(RIDk⊕
Rr‖N1 ⊕ Rs), without the knowledge of RIDk which is
not feasible. However, when received Rs and T1, any
adversary can return a random value N2. In the server
side, the severer searches whole its records to find a
match for N2 based on Rr , Rs and N1. In this case,
also any comparison is satisfied with the probability
of 2−n. Assuming that the server keeps the records of r
readers, the success probability of the adversary on each
try will be almost r2−n and after q queries, it will be
almost qr2−n.
• Impersonating the reader and the tag toward the server
will not be easier than impersonating any of them.
• To impersonate the server, assuming that the tag and the
reader are legitimate, given a fresh Rr and Rt and any
desired timestamps T1 and value of Rs, the adversary
should generate a valid N3 = h(RIDk ⊕ Rs‖Rr ) and
N4 = h(IDk ⊕ Rs‖Rt ), without the knowledge of RIDk
and IDk which is not feasible. However, when received
the reader response, any adversary can return random
values as N3 and N4. However, such random values are
accepted by the tag and the reader each one by the
probability of 2−n. Hence, the adversary’s advantage to
impersonate the server is upper bounded by 2−n on each
query and q2−n after q queries.
All in all, the proposed protocol is secure against imper-
sonation and replay attacks.
4) RESISTANCE AGAINST TRACEABILITY ATTACKS
To apply traceability attack, the adversary should find a
connection between the transferred messages over the public
channel and the identity of a protocol party or transferred
messages in previous sessions. However, in the proposed
protocol, any message which is transferred over a public
channel is generated by the hash function and has at least one
fresh random number as its input. Hence, from a session to
another session the adversary can see the fresh output of the
hash function that cannot be connected to each other. Hence,
the proposed protocol does not suffer from traceability attack.
5) RESISTANCE AGAINST AN ADVERSARY THAT
CAN CONTROL THE TIME
In this paper, we showed that several protocols suffer from
various attacks if the adversary can control the time of
a protocol’s party. However, in the proposed protocol,
the only source of time is the server which is more reliable
than the tag and the reader, and even if an adversary controls
the time, given that it has no control over the fresh nonce
introduced by the protocol’s parties, it cannot apply any of the
attacks suggested against those protocols. It worth to mention
that attack was possible because the server contribution to
the protocol randomization was only the timestamps, while
in the proposed protocol, the server also randomizes the
transferred messages by Rs. Hence, the proposed protocol
does not suffer from an adversary that can control the time
and desynchronization attack.
B. FORMAL PROOF OF SECURITY
Scyther [33] is a utility for checking the security properties of
a protocol which is written in Python. In this tool, the protocol
roles are written in Security Protocol Description Language
(spdl), and then the security claims of confidentiality and
authenticity are evaluated.
FIGURE 6. The proposed hash based mobile RFID mutual authentication
protocol.
The role description of improved protocol in spdl lan-
guage is depicted in Appendix VI. As illustrated in Fig. 6,
the Scyther tool cannot find any attacks for our proposed pro-
tocol. In addition, as shown in Table 2 , the protocol designed
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TABLE 2. The security comparison of the improved protocol with the
other protocols.
in this paper, unlike its predecessors, provides desired secu-
rity against the attacks in the context.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the security of four authenti-
cation protocols which with the aim of providing security
and privacy preservation in telecare medicine information
system and smart campus have been proposed. Precisely,
we presented reader and tag impersonation to server attack
and also server impersonation to the reader attacks against
Zheng et al. protocol.
Moreover, we present a new desynchronization attack
against Li et al., Zhou et al. and Benssalah et al. protocols
which exploits this weakness in these protocols where times-
tamps are generated by the mobile readers.
We also designed a protocol that, in addition to resolving
all the weaknesses of the four protocols, is also safe against
other known attacks. We also demonstrated in an informal
and formal way that the designed protocol is safe and suitable
for use in telecare medication information system and smart
campus.
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